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CASE COMMENTS
the goods, and since he would be irreparably damaged if the restriction
were not enforced. It is difficult to define plaintiff's interest in the
Kraft goods in terms of "good will." Certainly it is not the same in-
terest that Kraft itself had. Since the damaged goods may have been
of inferior quality, Kraft could have lost prestige or "good will" be-
cause of the defendant's disregard of the restriction. This kind of loss
is usually described in terms of "good will." This, however, was not
the loss the plaintiff feared. Nadell's sole basis for placing the re-
striction upon the goods was to retain good business relations with
Southern Pacific; its interest was strictly private between it and one
of its best sources of business. The court is not really protecting plain-
tiff's "good will" as the term is generally understood, but it is pro-
tecting the plaintiff against a breach of contract induced by the de-
fendant. It is submitted that the court could have decided this ques-
tion, and possibly the entire case, by a logical extension of Lumley v.
Gye,2 1 which held that a stranger to a contract may be liable in tort
for inducing its breach. Thus, it is not necessary to create an equitable
servitude on the goods in order to hold the defendant. Unless this
decision is explained on these grounds, it is submitted that the court
may well have extended the concept of "good will" beyond the tradi-
tional meaning of the term, which is usually associated with the gen-
eral public's attitude toward a certain business or its product, to in-
clude relationships between private parties.
The cases dealing with equitable servitudes on chattels are still in
conflict, and the courts have failed to provide definite rules to de-
termine their validity. Certainly, the weight of authority is against
the enforceability of such restrictions, most of this having been decided
over three decades ago. It is hoped that the next court which has to
pass upon this problem will deal with the question at hand, look at
the policy for and against such restrictions, and make its decision
upon that basis.
JOSEPH E. ULRICH
PRIVACY INVADED BY WRONGFUL PRESENTATION
OF PRIVILEGED NEWS
Several problems remain unresolved in the growing but still hazy
area of the law known as the right of privacy. Today, because of the
rapid dissemination of printed material which advances modern means
M2 E.:B. 216 (1853).
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for inquiring into man's private affairs and lowers esteem for individ-
ual rights, the need for a thorough understanding of the right of pri-
vacy is imperative.1 A current question in the field is whether an other-
wise privileged newspaper article can be made so sensational as to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy by going beyond the
recognized limits of decency.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was recently confronted with
this very problem in Aquino v. Bulletin Co. 2 The plaintiffs were the
parents of Theresa Aquino, who after a clandestine courtship, married
against her parents' wishes. Shortly after the marriage, Theresa was
informed by her husband that his only purpose in marrying her was
to spite the plaintiffs; thereupon she obtained a divorce.3 Subsequently,
the defendant, Bulletin Company, published in its Sunday supple-
ment an illustrated article concerning the affair entitled "Marriage
for Spite." Although the article was based upon the lower court's
record of the divorce action, it was written in a fictionalized story form
rather than in conventional newspaper style.4 The accompanying il-
lustration, although not resembling the parties,5 was extremely dra-
matic and contributed to the objectionable nature of the article.
In affirming the existence of a right of privacy in Pennsylvania, the
supreme court ruled that the subject matter of the article was privi-
leged as current news.6 Therefore, the plaintiffs, as unwilling partici-
"'We are living in an age of ruthless standardization which has resulted in the
suppression of human individuality. Coupled with this is the exploitation by the
press and advertising agencies of all 'human interest' materials available. The timely
recognition by the courts of the right of privacy may aid in preserving the 'self'
as an institution of modern life." Moreland, The Right of Privacy To-day, ig Ky.
LJ. ioi, 136 (1931)-
'154 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1959).
'It is interesting to note that although the court reported that the marriage was
never consummated, Theresa's original suit for annulment was denied but her sub-
sequent suit for divorce was granted. Id. at 426.
4"Only by reading the article can one appreciate how the author permitted his
imagination to roam through the facts, and how newsworthy events were presented
in a style used almost exclusively by writers of fiction." 154 A.2d at 428.
'154 A.2d at 428. In Young v. Greneker Studios Inc., 175 Misc. 1027, 26 N.Y.S.2d
357 (Sup. Ct. 1941), a "manikin" was held to be a "portrait or picture" under the
N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51. In Monson v. Tussauds, Ltd. [1894] 1 Q.B. 571 (C.A.)
a "wax figure dummy" was held to be a "portrait."
6154 A.2d at 427- The court decided that because the article was published only
eighteen days after the lower court's opinion, it was current. Some courts have em-
phasized the passage of a considerable span of time from the act to the publication
as a factor in holding a story violative of an individual's privacy, e.g., Melvin v. Reid,
112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (seven years). However, other
courts have failed to consider such time intervals in reaching their decisions, e.g.,
Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 8o6 (2d Cir. 1940) (thirty years), and Kim-
merle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 262 N.Y. 99, 186 N.E. 217 (1933) (twenty-
five years).
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pants in a newsworthy event, ordinarily could not complain.7 How-
ever, the court found that the parents' right of privacy was violated
by the method of presentation and awarded damages entirely upon
the injury to their own feelings, as distinguished from injury to their
public reputation or their daughter's injured reputation or feelings.8
The right of privacy has been defined in a majority of jurisdictions
as the right to live one's life in seclusion without being subjected to
unwarranted and undesirable publicity-the right to be let alone.' 0
This right has received increasing recognition through legislative en-
actment and court decision" since it was first propounded by Samuel
D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in an 189o law review article.' 2
7The court felt that even though the plaintiffs were not mentioned by name in
the lower court's record, the defendant could fill in such names in their story without
violating the plaintiff's right of privacy. 154 A.2d at 427.
8Although the authorities say that the right of privacy is a purely personal
right-Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958); Metter v. Los
Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 3o.1, 95 P.2d 491 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939); Kelley v.
Post Publishing Co., 327 Mass. 275, 98 N.E.2d 286 (1951); Prosser, Torts § 97 (2d ed.
1955); 41 Am. Jur. Privacy §§ 15-16 (1942); 77 C.J.S. Right of Privacy § (195 2)-there
is a growing tendency to recognize, as in Aquino, a "relational" right of privacy.
Abernathy v. Thornton, 83 So. 2d 235 (Ala. 1955); Bazemore v. Savanah Hospital, 171
Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (193o); Nizer, The Right of Privacy: A Half Century's Develop-
ments, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 526 ('941); Comment, 1953 Wash. U. L. Q. log.
"It now appears that more than twenty states recognize a right of privacy in
one form or another. Gregory and Kalven, Cases on Torts 888 (1959); 1 Harper and
James, Torts § 9.6 (1956); Prosser, Torts § 97 (2d ed. 1955); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22
(1942). The right of privacy was recently held to exist in West Virginia. Roach v.
Harper, 1o5 S.E.2d 564 (W.Va. 1958).
',Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948); Banks
v. King Features Syndicate, Inc., 3o F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1939)- Metter v. Los An-
geles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939); Pavesich v.
New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 19o, 50 S.E. 68 (19o5); Johnson v. Boeing Airplane
Co., 175 Kan. 275, 262 P.2d 8o8 (1953); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.V. 967
(1927); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942). See also Prosser,
Torts § 97 (2d ed. 1955); Restatement, Torts § 867 (1939); 41 Am. Jur. Privacy § 2
(1942); 77 C.J.S. Right of Privacy § 1 (1952).
"Gregory and Kalven, Cases on Torts 888 (1959); 1 Harper and James, Torts § 9
(1956); Prosser, Torts § 97 (2d ed. 1955); Am. Jur. Privacy § 4 (1942); 77 C.J.S.
Right of Privacy § 1 (1952); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22 (1942). Three states, New York,
Utah, and Virginia, have a right of privacy by statute. These statutes provide a
limited right only and New York has held that it has no common law right of
privacy and that the cause is limited to the statute. Kimmerle v. New York Evening
Journal, Inc., 262 N.Y. 99, 186 N.E. 217 (1933); Myers v. U.S. Camera Pub. Corp.,
167 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957). See also Yanwich, The Right of Privacy, 27
Notre Dame Law. 499 (1952). The Virginia statute, Va. Code Ann. § 8-650 (1957), is
based on the New York Act and follows a limited right theory. However, it appears
no Virginia cases have interpreted the act. Note, 38 Va. L. Rev. 117 (1952)-
2"Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (189o). For
an excellent historical development of the right of privacy see Nizer, The Right of
Privacy; A Half Century's Developments, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 526 (1941).
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While the right is related to several fields of law1 3 and may be violated
by diverse wrongs,1 4 the gravamen of the cause of action is either (i) a
business tort-the use of a famous individual's personal goodwill with-
out compensation, or (2) an emotional injury tort-the use of an un-
known individual's personality so as to disturb his solitude and emo-
tional tranquility.1 5 A loss or waiver of the right occurs when one be-
comes involved either by choice or by chance in a matter of public in-
terest.' 6 Aquino is an example of an emotional-injury tort involving
"chance" public figures.
Although several reasons have been advanced for denying or limit-
ing the right of privacy, .7 the only substantial one is that it conflicts
with freedom of speech and press.' 8 Because these freedoms are not
"Constitutional, Tort, and Equity. Moreland, The Right of Privacy To-day,
ig Ky. L.J. 101 (1931); Note, 15 U. Chi. L. Rev. 926 (1948).
14N iretapping, shadowing or trailing, eavesdropping, publication of letters,
debt collection, invasion of private rooms, and unfair competition by commercial
use of name. 41 Am. Jur. Privacy § 27-31 (1942); 77 C.J.S. Right of Privacy (1952);
Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22 (1942).
33Gregory and Kalven, Cases on Torts 888 (1959). Privacy is related to, but differs
from, the tort action for defamation. In privacy the injury is to be plaintiff's personal
feelings, whereas in defamation the injury is to the the plaintiff's public reputation.
Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945); Themo v.
New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 753 (194o). Also,
in privacy, truth is no defense. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927);
Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.V.2d 291 (1942). Proof of specific damage
is unnecessary. Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., supra at 139; Johnson v.
Boeing Airplane Co., 175 Kan. 275, 262 P.2d 8o8 (1953). For additional material
see Prosser, Torts § 97 (2d ed. 1955); 77 C.J.S. Right of Privacy §§ 4-5 (1952); Annot.,
138 A.L.R. 22 (1942).
"Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958); Berg v. Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 857 (D. Minn. 1948); Abernathy v. Thornton, 83
So. 2d 235 (Ala. 1955); Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 3o4, 95 P.2d
491 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 19o, 50 S.E.
68 (19o5). See also Restatement, Torts § 867 (1939); Prosser, Torts § 97 (2d ed. 1955);
Nizer, The Right of Privacy-A Half Century's Developments, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 526
(1941); Note, 28 Ind. L.J. 179 (1953); 41 Am. Jur. Privacy §§ 19-23 (1942); 77 C.J.S.
Right of Privacy §§ 2-3,6 (1952); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22 (1942).
'-Six reasons for denying the existence of the right of privacy are: (x) that it was
never recognized as a common law substantive right; (2) that there was a lack of
precedent; (3) that its recognition would bring about a vast amount of litigation; (4)
that the recovery is for mental suffering alone which the law is hesitant to recognize;
(5) that the determination of damages would be difficult; (6) the difficulty in
determining the difference between public and private characters. Moreland, The
Right of Privacy To-day, 19 Ky. L.J. 1o (1931). But see Lisle, The Right of Privacy
(A Contra View), 19 Ky. L.J. 137 (1931).
"8Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 150 S.W.2d 291 (1942); Prosser, Torts § 97
(2d ed. 1955); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22 (1942). Nizer said that the right of privacy is es-
sentially "anti-social" and "is a recognition of the dignity of solitude, of the majesty
of man's free will and the power to mold his own destiny .... " He further described
the conflict between these freedoms as a battle between anarchy and fascism in their
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absolute, they do not wholly deny the right of privacy; however, most
courts recognize that the freedoms of speech and press are limitations
on the right. 1 These limitations led to the development of the privi-
lege for news material, but this very privilege has caused a conflict
between the interests of individual freedom and group freedom. In
weighing these conflicting interests, the courts have invented various
theories of liability, i.e., tests to balance the news privilege against the
extent of the invasion of privacy.
The earliest test of privileged news material has been called the
public figure test.20 The privilege under this test originally encom-
passed almost any material concerning a person who had chosen a
public calling, e.g., a public official, an actor, or an inventor; but the
privilege was later extended to include unwilling participants in
events of public interest. Apparently the public figure test was an
oversimplified solution to the problem, and, therefore, it evolved
into the public interest test.2 ' By use of this test, courts considered
the effect of the challenged material upon the public rather than
finding, almost automatically, a waiver by a public figure. This test was
one-sided, for the public is frequently interested in what is most in-
jurious to the individual's feelings. Consequently, the public interest
test evolved into the public decency test.22
Although Warren and Brandeis alluded to this test in their now
famous article,23 it was not fully developed until recently.24 The
extremes. Nizer, The Right of Privacy-A Half Century's Developments, 39 Mich.
L. Rev. 526, 528-29 (1941).
lPavesich v. New England Life Iris. Co., 122 Ga. 19o, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Prosser,
Torts § 97 (2d ed. 1955); Nizer, The Right of Privacy: A Half Century's Develop-
ments, 39 Mich L. Rev. 526, 529 (1941); Note, 28 Ind. L.J. 179 (1953); 41 Am. Jur.
Privacy § 9 (1942); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22 (1942). Freedom of speech and press have
consistently been held not to be absolute freedoms. Note, 28 Ind. L.J. 179 (1953); 41
Am. Jur. Privacy § 9 (1942); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22 (1942). California bases its right
of privacy on the constitutional guarantees of life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap-
piness. Kenby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 2d 3o4, 127 P.2d 577 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1942); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931);
Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22, 30 (1942).
2°Nizer, The Right of Privacy-A Half Century's Developments, g9 Mich. L.
Rev. 526, 540 (1941); Comment, 13 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 255, 259 (1956); Note, 28 Ind.
L.J. 179, 182 (1953)-
2 'Nizer, The Right of Privacy-A Half Century's Developments, 59 Mich. L.
Rev. 526, 540 (1941); Comment, 13 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 255, 260 (1956); Note, 28 Ind.
L.J. 179, 183 (1953).
nNizer, The Right of Privacy-A Half Century's Developments, 39 Mich. L. Rev.
526, 540 (1941); Comment, 13 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 255, 262 (1956; Note, 28 Ind. L.J.
179, 183 (1953)- This test is frequently called the "mores" test.
3Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
24See note 22 supra.
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public decency test is a combination of the best aspects of both the
public figure and public interest tests. It attempts to balance the
character and nature of the invasion of individual rights against the
benefit to the public of the material published. In applying the test,
the courts usually require the article to be of news, educational or
informational value,2 5 and not indecent or repugnant to the social con-
science of the time and place.20 This test recognizes that even the most
renowned public figures have a right to privacy in certain areas of
life; 27 however, it does require the determination of a moral issue,
something courts have traditionally been loathe to do. In the final
analysis, the public decency test is a good versus bad test. Under this
test the courts frequently consider the plaintiff's cause in terms of
recognized community standards of morality and on this basis decide
whether the defendant's conduct is decent or indecent, i.e., good or
bad.
28
wDonahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Inc., 194 F.2d 6 (soth Cir. 1952); Gill v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 239 P.2d 630 (Calif. 19D2). See also Jenkins v. Dell Publishing
Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958) (entertainment).
25Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3 d Cir. 1958); Garner v. Triangle
Publications Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Abernathy v. Thornton, 83 So. 2d
235 (Ala. 1955); Restatement Torts § 867, comment c (1939); Note, 28 Ind. L.J. 179
(1953)-
'Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 8W6 (2d Cir. 1940); Garner v. Triangle
Publications Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 5951); Carson v. Baskin, 30 So. 2d 635
(Fla. 1947); Restatement, Torts § 867 (1939); Nizer, The Right of Privacy-A Half
Century's Developments, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 526 (194-). One paradox under the old
tests was that the persons most likely to need the cause of action (public figures)
because of the publicity surrounding them seemed to be the ones who could not
claim any protection. Note, 15 U. Chi. L. Rev. 926 (1948).
2-In Jones v. Hearold Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929), the court felt
that the statements printed in a newspaper attributing to the plaintiff an attack on
her husband's assassins were morally decent, because they made her appear as a
heroine and should have pleased her. For additional cases where the court discussed
the moral decency concept and felt the articles were complimentary to the plaintiffs,
see Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 175 Kan. 275, 262 P.2d 8o8 0953); Kemmerle
v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 262 N.Y. 99, 186 N.E. 217 (1933); Hillman v. Star
Publishing Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594 (91).
In Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 2d 304, 127 P.2d 577 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1942), the court felt that the statements attributed to someone with the
same name as the plaintiff were printed in such a way as to appear to have been
personally written by the plaintiff. The statements distributed by defendant to over
1,oo men to advertise a movie were suggestive and imputed immoral acts to the
plaintiff and hence were so indecent as to invade the plaintiff's right of privacy. For
additional cases in which courts have felt the publications were indecent enough to
injure plaintiff's feelings, see Banks v. King Features Syndicate, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 352
(S.D.N.Y. 1939); Melvin v. Reid, sma Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931);
Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 0942); Thompson v. Close-up,
Inc., 277 App. Div. 848, 98 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Sup. Ct. 195o); Feeney v. Young, 191 App.
Div. 501, 181 N.Y. Supp. 481 (Sup. Ct. 1920). See also Myers v. U. S. Camera Pub-
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Although many courts have either expressly or impliedly used a
decency test, some have refused to accept it. In the Massachusetts
case of Thayer v. Worchester Post Co.,29 the plaintiff had consented
to be photographed with four others, including her husband and his
chauffeur at a public airport. In a subsequent divorce action her
husband accused her of participating in an amorous affair with the
chauffeur. The defendant newspaper, in an account of the divorce
scandal, as it was called, published the photograph deleting all the
parties except the plaintiff and the chauffeur. The court, in rejecting
the plantiff's privacy action, said that she consented to being photo-
graphed in a public place. However, it is submitted that the plain-
tiff did not consent to being photographed with the chauffeur alone.
Publication of the picture as taken would not have been as offensive
to the plaintiff's feelings as the retouched picture, which tended to
over emphasize the familiarity between the plaintiff and the chauffeur.
The photograph was a fictional presentation of the facts and tended
to make the actual story more sensational.
In Aquino the court, facing the same basic problem, applied the
decency test and held that even though news of the marriage and
subsequent divorce was privileged, the method of presentation was not;
it had turned an otherwise morally acceptable news item into one
that was morally unacceptable. 30 The court indicated that the use of
a completely sensational method of presentation of the whole article
had been the factor which made the otherwise innocent material un-
acceptable.
31
In particular, the court stressed the fictional style of writing-a
style usually reserved for "stories."32 While some authorities deplore
the judicial tendency to hold otherwise privileged material indecent
solely because it is presented in a fictional style,33 even they admit
lishing Corp., 167 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957), wherein the court felt that the
unauthorized publication of a nude photograph in a magazine was indecent.
22 4 8 Mass. 16o, 187 N.E. 292 (933).
'nThe court in Aquino felt that they could not say as a matter of law that the
article did not invade the plaintiff's privacy and felt that the question was one for
the jury. 154 A.2d 422, 429 (1959).
.'Several writers have indicated that the courts have frequently operated under
a "newspaper bias" in that they have tended to hold any article found in a news-
paper privileged no matter how worded. Nizer, The Right of Privacy-A Half Cen-
tury's Developments, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 526 ('94'); Note, 28 Ind. L.J. 179 (1953). It is
submitted that Aquino certainly overcame any possible "newspaper bias."
3Other factors stressed by the court were (i) that the article was in the Sunday
Supplement and not the news section, (2) that the title was in "story style," (3)
that the article was accompanied by a dramatic half page illustration. 154 A.2d at 427.
"WNizer, The Right of Privacy-A Half Century's Developments, 39 Mich. L.
Rev. 526 (1941); Note, 28 Ind. L.J. 179 (1953)-
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